Jeannine Perrenoud and Linda Jenkins v. Lila Ann Harman and Lloyd Mitchell : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1998
Jeannine Perrenoud and Linda Jenkins v. Lila Ann
Harman and Lloyd Mitchell : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Randall L. Skeen; Attorneys for Appellees.
Scott B. Mitchell; Attorney for Appellants.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Perrenoud v. Harman, No. 981721 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1998).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/1879
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
* * K * 
JEANNINE PERRENOUD and 
LINDA JENKINS, 
PlaintIf fs/Appe1lants, 
/s • 
LILA ANN HARMAN and L.I,,OVI) 
MITCHELL, 
Defendants/Appeilees. 
* 
APPELLANTS1 OPENING BRIEF 
Priority ±.'o 
P L A I N T I F F S 1 APPEAL FROM * 
D I S T R I C T CQ'JRl, l i i i i HONORABLE WILLIAM THORNE P R E S I D I N G 
+ * 
Scott b. Mit cue x I ^ b i J j. 
2469 East 7000 South 
Suite 20^ 1 
Salt Lake ciny, ucah K<> 
Attorney for Appellants 
Randall L. Skeen (297(1) 
5788 South 900 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
Attorney for Appellees 
BESS*-, 
F*LfcJ 
Wah Court of Appeals 
NOV 0 8 1B99 
JuHaD'Alesandro 
Cterkofthecoort 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES i 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 1 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, ETC 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
I. Nature of the Case 2 
II. Statement of Facts 2 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 4 
ARGUMENT 5 
The trial court erred in granting defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment and denying plaintiffs' Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment 5 
A. Rhoda Thurber's revocation of the Declaration 
of Trust was in breach of her fiduciary duty 
to plaintiffs and is, therefore, voidable 5 
B. Rhoda Thurber did not succeed to all of the powers 
previously belonging to the joint trustees . . . . 12 
CONCLUSION 13 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 13 
ADDENDUM 
Declaration of Trust 
Hearing Transcript 
Findings of Fact and Summary Judgment 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
In re Estate of West, 
948 P.2d 351 (Utah 1997) 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13 
Makoff v. Makoff, 
528 P.2d 797 (Utah 1974) 10, 11 
Mills v. Brody, 929 P.2d 360 (Utah App. 1996) 1 
West v. West, 
915 P. 2d 504 (Utah App. 1996) 6 
Statutes and Rules 
Utah Code Annotated section 78-2a-3(2)(j) 1 
Utah Code Annotated section 75-7-302 9 
Utah Code Annotated section 75-7-404(2) 10 
i 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal 
by virtue of Utah Code Ann. section 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court erred in granting summary 
judgment in favor of defendants. Summary judgment presents only 
questions of law reviewable for correctness. Mills v. Brody, 929 
P.2d 360 (Utah App. 1996). This issue was preserved in the trial 
court by plaintiffs1 Reply in Support of Plaintiffs1 Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment and Response to Defendant Harmon's 
Motion for Summary Judgment (R.63), and by the arguments 
presented to the trial court at the August 28, 1998 hearing on 
the parties1 motions for summary judgment. (R.127) 
2. Whether the trial court erred in denying plaintiffs1 
motion for partial summary judgment. Summary judgment presents 
only questions of law reviewable for correctness. Mills v. 
Brody, 929 P.2d 360 (Utah App. 1996). This issue was preserved 
in the trial court by plaintiffs1 Memorandum in Support of Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment (R.55), the Reply in Support of 
Plaintiffs1 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Response to 
Defendant Harmon's Motion for Summary Judgment (R.63), and by the 
arguments presented to the trial court at the August 28, 1998 
hearing on the parties1 motions for summary judgment. (R.127) 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, ETC. 
There are no determinative constitutional provisions, 
statutes, ordinances, rules, or regulations whose interpretation 
is determinative or of central importance to this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from a final order of the Third Judicial 
District Court of Salt Lake County granting defendants1 Motion 
for Summary Judgment and denying plaintiffs1 Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment. 
II. Statement of Facts 
1. On or about April 1, 1980, Joseph W. Thurber and Rhoda 
Thurber, as trustors, executed a Declaration of Trust in which 
they declared that they were holding in trust, among other 
things, the real property located at 2480 Alden Street, Salt Lake 
City, Utah. (R.6) 
2. Joseph W. Thurber is the deceased father of plaintiff 
Jeannine Perrenoud and the deceased stepfather of plaintiff Linda 
Jenkins and defendants Lila Ann Harman and Lloyd Mitchell. Rhoda 
Thurber is the deceased stepmother of plaintiff Jeannine 
Perrenoud and the deceased mother of all of the other parties. 
(R.l-2) 
3. The Declaration of Trust was properly recorded with the 
Office of the Salt Lake County Recorder on April 14, 1980. (R.2) 
4. On April 1, 1980, the trustors also Quit-Claimed the 
real property to themselves as Trustees under the terms of the 
Declaration of Trust. The Quit-Claim Deed was properly recorded 
with the Office of the Salt Lake County Recorder on April 14, 
1980. (R.2) 
5. Joseph W. Thurber predeceased Rhoda Thurber. 
Thereafter, on or about August 5, 1992, Rhoda Thurber, as Trustee 
of the Joseph W. Thurber and Rhoda Thurber Trust, sold the real 
property. (R.3) 
6. The purchasers, defendant Lila Ann Harman's daughter and 
son-in-law, Holli Bezzant and Robert Bezzant, executed a 
Promissory Note calling for monthly payments of $612.00. (R.37) 
7. Pursuant to the express terms of the trust, the proceeds 
of the sale of the real property became part of the trust res. 
(R.7) 
8. Plaintiffs are two of the four beneficiaries of the 
trust. Defendants are the other two beneficiaries. (R.6) 
9. The trust specifically states that "if one of the above 
listed should be deceased, the beneficiaries cannot be changed." 
(R.7) 
10. Between January and July of 1997, and without 
authorization or consent, defendants Lila Ann Harman and Lloyd 
Mitchell wrongfully exercised dominion and control over the trust 
res in a manner inconsistent with plaintiffs1 rights therein. 
Specifically, defendants received monthly payments on the above 
referenced Promissory Note in the sum of $4,284.00 which they 
converted to their own use and benefit. (R.37) 
11. Plaintiffs filed their Complaint commencing this action 
on September 4, 1997. An Amended Complaint was filed on or about 
March 2, 1998. Therein, plaintiffs allege causes of action for 
breach of fiduciary duty and conversion. (R.48) 
12. Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
on or about February 28, 1998, requesting that the trial court 
enter summary judgment on plaintiffs1 conversion claim. (R.54) 
13. On or about March 10, 1998, defendant Lila Ann Harmon 
filed her Opposition to Plaintiffs1 Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment and Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. (R.30) 
14. A hearing on both motions was held before the trial 
court on August 28, 1998. On October 4, 1998 the trial court 
entered Findings of Fact and Summary Judgment. Therein, 
defendants were granted summary judgment and plaintiffs1 
Complaint was dismissed with prejudice. (R.126a) 
15. Plaintiffs timely filed their Notice of Appeal on 
October 30, 1998. (R.116) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Plaintiffs became beneficiaries of the trust when it was 
created on April 1, 1980. Plaintiffs1 beneficial interests were 
not contingent on their survival of the trustors as the trial 
court found. Accordingly, Rhoda Thurber, as trustee, owed a 
fiduciary duty to plaintiffs which she breached when she revoked 
the trust and sold the property to defendant Lila Ann Harman's 
daughter and son-in-law. The sale is, therefore, voidable. 
Additionally, the trust instrument specifically prohibits 
any change of beneficiaries after the death of one of the 
trustors. The clear intent of this provision is that, after the 
death of one of the trustors, the other trustor would not be able 
to terminate the beneficial interest of his or her step-children. 
A 
The trial court emasculated the trustors1 intent by ruling that 
Rhoda Thurber was entitled to end run this prohibition by simply 
revoking the trust, thereby terminating the interest of her step-
daughter, plaintiff Jeannine Perrenoud. 
ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in granting defendants1 Motion for 
Summary Judgment and denying plaintiffs1 Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment. 
The determinative questions with respect to the issue of 
whether the trial court erred in ruling on the parties1 
respective motions for summary judgment are: (1) Whether Rhoda 
Thurber could, consistent with her fiduciary duty as trustee, 
revoke the trust by selling the property to defendant Harman's 
daughter and son-in-law; and (2) whether Rhoda Thurber, following 
Joseph W. Thurberfs death, succeeded to all the powers previously 
belonging to the joint trustees. As discussed in detail below, 
plaintiffs respectfully submit that both questions must be 
answered in the negative and, therefore, that defendants1 motion 
for summary judgment should have been denied and plaintiffs1 
motion for partial summary judgment should have been granted. 
A. Rhoda Thurber1s revocation of the Declaration 
of Trust was in breach of her fiduciary duty to 
plaintiffs and is, therefore, voidable. 
Relying on the Supreme Court of Utah's decision in In re 
Estate of West, 948 P.2d 351 (Utah 1997), the trial court held 
that Rhoda Thurber did not breach any fiduciary duty to 
plaintiffs when she revoked the trust because at that time she 
was the sole surviving active beneficiary of the trust and 
plaintiffs were contingent beneficiaries. Therefore, according 
to the trial court, Rhoda Thurber did not owe plaintiffs a 
fiduciary duty at the time she revoked the trust. Except for two 
crucial distinctions discussed in detail below, the JVest case is 
directly on point with the case at bar. It is not, however, 
helpful to defendants. 
In that case, Herschel West and his first wife Hazel 
executed a Declaration of Trust declaring that they held their 
Provo home in trust for the benefit of themselves and after their 
deaths for their three adult children. After Hazel's death, 
Herschel executed a Quit Claim Deed conveying the property to 
himself and his second wife as joint tenants with full rights of 
survivorship. After Herschel1s death and their discovery that 
the property was not included in his estate, the children brought 
suit against the second wife alleging that the Quit Claim Deed 
was voidable as a violation of Herschelfs fiduciary duty as 
trustee. The trial court granted judgment on the pleadings in 
favor of the second wife. This Court reversed, West v. West, 915 
P.2d 504 (Utah App. 1996), and the Supreme Court of Utah granted 
certiorari, 925 P.2d 963 (Utah 1996), reversed this Courtfs 
judgment, and reinstated the judgment of the trial court. 948 
P.2d at 356. 
In doing so, the Supreme Court identified three 
determinative questions: "(1) whether the West Trust did in fact 
authorize Hershel and Hazel as trustees to sell or otherwise 
dispose of the house and thereby revoke the trust,(2) whether 
Herschel West, following Hazel Westfs death, became the sole 
trustee and succeeded to all the powers previously belonging to 
the joint trustees, and (3) whether Herschel West could, 
consistent with his fiduciary duty as trustee, remove the house 
from the trust by quitclaiming it to himself and his second 
wife." 948 P.2d at 353-354. 
As indicated above, only the second and third of the 
questions posed by the West court are at issue in the case at 
bar: whether Rhoda Thurber succeeded to all the powers previously 
belonging to the joint trustees, and whether Rhoda Thurber could, 
consistent with her fiduciary duty as trustee, remove the house 
from the trust by deeding it to defendant Harmanfs daughter and 
son-in-law. Plaintiffs will address the second question in part 
B below. 
With respect to the third question (i.e., "whether Herschel 
West could, consistent with his fiduciary duty as trustee, remove 
the house from the trust") , the West court held that as sole 
surviving trustee Herschel "could sell or dispose of the property 
as he saw fit. This involved no breach of his fiduciary duty 
since he was at that point the sole beneficiary." 948 P. 2d at 
356. 
As stated above, the West case is directly on point with the 
case at bar, with two crucial distinctions. First, unlike Rhoda 
Thurber in the case at bar, Herschel West was not only the sole 
surviving trustee, he was also the sole present beneficiary of 
the trust. The Supreme Court explained as follows: 
The trust instrument is clear that the children do not 
become beneficiaries until the "death of the survivor"1 of 
the two settlors. The instrument provides: 
NOW, THEREFORE, KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS, that we 
do hereby acknowledge and declare that we hold and will 
hold said real property and all our right, title and 
interest in and to said property and all furniture, 
fixtures and personal property situated therein on the 
date of the death of the survivor of us, IN TRUST. 
1. For the use and benefit of the following (3) 
persons [naming the three children]. 
([Supreme Court's] emphasis added). The children's rights 
are subject to divestiture and will not ripen until the 
death of the surviving settlor.z 
Consequently, we conclude that Herschel West, Sr., as 
sole trustee, could sell or dispose of the property as he 
saw fit. This involved no breach of his fiduciary duty 
since he was at that point the sole beneficiary. 
948 P.2d at 355-356 (emphasis partly original). 
Thus, the West court held that Herschel West's Quit Claim 
Deed to himself and his second wife was not in violation of his 
fiduciary duty to the beneficiaries of the trust because at that 
point he was the only beneficiary. Under the express terms of 
the trust, Herschel's children would not become beneficiaries 
until his death, or, in the language of the trust instrument upon 
the "death of the survivor of us." Id. 
In the case at bar, however, plaintiffs have been present 
beneficiaries of the trust since its execution on April 1, 1980. 
In contrast to the trust instrument at issue in West, here the 
Declaration of Trust specifically states that: 
Emphasis added. 
2Citations omitted. 
NOW, THEREFORE, KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS, that we 
do hereby acknowledge and declare that we hold and will hold 
said real property and all right, title and interest in and 
to said property and all furniture, fixtures and personal 
property situated therein IN TRUST: 
1. For the use and benefit of the following FOUR 
persons in equal shares per stirpes: 
1. LLOYD MELVIN MITCHELL (OUR SON) 
2. LILA ANN HARMAN (OUR DAU.) 
3. LINDA MARIE JENKINS (OUR DAU.) 
4. JEANNINE PERRENOUD (OUR DAU.) 
(R.6) Unlike the trust instrument at issue in West, there is no 
provision that plaintiffs were not to become beneficiaries until 
the "death of the survivor" of the two settlors. 
In short, in West "the trust instrument [was] clear that the 
children [would] not become beneficiaries until the ^death of the 
survivor"3 of the two settlors." Conversely, in the case at bar 
the trust instrument is clear that plaintiffs became 
beneficiaries on the date of its execution, April 1, 1980. 
Thus, unlike Herschel West, in the case at bar Rhoda Thurber 
was not the sole beneficiary when she revoked the trust. 
Plaintiffs were also beneficiaries. Accordingly, Rhoda owed 
fiduciary obligations to plaintiffs as described in West: 
[e]xcept as otherwise provided by the terms of the trust, a 
trustee shall observe standards in dealing with the trust 
assets that would be observed by a prudent man dealing with 
the property of another ... Any ... transaction which is 
affected by a substantial conflict of interest on the part 
of the trustee, is voidable by any interested person, ... 
unless ... the trust expressly authorized the transaction.4 
948 P.2d at 355 (quoting Utah Code Ann. sections 75-7-302 & 
3948 P.2d at 355 (emphasis added). 
4Citation omitted. 
404(2)). 
There is no question that Rhoda Thurber's revocation of the 
trust was in violation of her fiduciary duty to plaintiffs and 
was tainted by a conflict of interest. Plaintiffs1 beneficial 
interests were terminated and effectively transferred to Rhoda»s 
other two children. Accordingly, the revocation is voidable and 
the proceeds of the sale of the property remain part of the trust 
res. Defendants receipt and use of those proceeds for their own 
benefit was, therefore, actionable conversion under the 
undisputed facts of this case. 
Also distinguishing the case at bar from West is the fact 
that in their Declaration of Trust Joseph Thurber and Rhoda 
Thurber specifically stated their intention that if one of them 
should die the other would not be able to do exactly what in 
effect Rhoda did after Joseph died, i.e., change the 
beneficiaries. The second to last paragraph of the Declaration 
of Trust provides that "If one of the above listed should be 
deceased, the beneficiaries cannot be changed." (R.7) 
In Makoff v. Makoff, 528 P.2d 797, 798 (Utah 1974), the 
Supreme Court of Utah stated that: 
The general rules of construction of written instruments 
apply to the construction of trust instruments, and those 
rules require a determination of the intention of the 
settlor... [I]n ascertaining the intention of the settlor we 
may consider the entire instrument aided by the surrounding 
circumstances existing at the time of creation of the trust. 
(Emphasis added). 
In the case at bar, the intention of Joseph and Rhoda 
Thurber is clear: after one of them died, the other would not be 
able to cut his or her step-children out of the picture. 
Nonetheless, the trial court held that the trust instrument's 
prohibition against changing beneficiaries did not prevent Rhoda 
Thurber from revoking the trust and effectively transferring the 
res to defendants. (R.126c, paragraph 15) At the August 28, 
1998 hearing on the parties1 motions for summary judgment, the 
trial court explained as follows: 
I'm going to grant Summary Judgment finding that the 
trust was terminated by the sell (sic) of the property. The 
language, I'm assuming for the sake of argument that Mr. 
Mitchell is correct that the parties wanted to set up a 
trust that would not be changed after one died. I mean, I 
read that as the intent of the language where it says, "If 
one of the above listed should be deceased, the 
beneficiaries cannot be changed." But I'm going to find as 
a matter of law that that is insufficient to prevent the 
revocation of the trust after one of them dies. 
That the language is a revocable trust and as such one 
of the trustees can revoke it. They could not change the 
beneficiaries. The parties are not here, we're stuck with 
the language that they agreed upon. The language that they 
agreed upon was that the beneficiaries could not be changed 
as opposed to the trust could not be revoked. I happen to 
think it's an unfortunate result but I think that's what the 
language compels. 
(R.127, pages 20-21)(emphasis added). 
Plaintiffs respectfully submit that it is clear that in 
interpreting the trust instrument the trial court wanted to, but 
mistakenly believed it was prohibited from "consider[ing] the 
entire instrument aided by the surrounding circumstances existing 
at the time of creation of the trust." 528 P. 2d at 798. To the 
contrary, the trial court believed it was constrained to look at 
the trust provision authorizing revocation without regard to the 
trust provision which the trial court specifically interpreted as 
meaning that the trustors intended "to set up a trust that would 
not be changed after one died." 
In other words, the trial court believed that both Joseph 
Thurber and Rhoda Thurber intended to restrict each others right 
to terminate their step-childrensf beneficial interests in the 
trust after the death of one of them. Nonetheless, the trial 
court believed that it was required to read the revocation 
language in the trust in isolation, thereby allowing Rhoda to end 
run that intention by simply revoking the trust, rather than 
changing beneficiaries. 
B. Rhoda Thurber did not succeed to all of the powers 
previously belonging to the joint trustees. 
As set forth above, one of the questions which the Supreme 
Court found determinative in West was "whether Herschel West, 
following Hazel West's death, ... succeeded to all of the powers 
previously belonging to the joint trustees..." 948 P.2d at 353. 
As it did with the other two questions, the Supreme Court also 
answered this question in the affirmative. However, its 
rationale for doing so is clearly not applicable to the case at 
bar. Justice Howe explained that the instrument at issue in that 
case must be construed as granting the sole trustee the same 
powers as the joint trustees previously had: 
Otherwise, a sole trustee would have less power than the 
joint trustees held. That would be illogical, as nothing in 
the trust instrument denies to a sole trustee any of the 
powers possessed by the joint trustees. 
948 P.2d at 354 (emphasis added). 
However, as discussed in part A above, the trust instrument 
at issue in this case does in fact specifically deny a sole 
trustee power possessed by the joint trustees, i.e., the power to 
change beneficiaries. The trial court unequivocally stated its 
belief that the trustors "wanted to set up a trust that would not 
be changed after one died." (R.125, page 20) Accordingly, the 
case at bar is distinguishable from West. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, plaintiffs respectfully request that 
the trial court's order granting summary judgment in favor of 
defendants be reversed and that this case be remanded to the 
trial court with instructions for the entry of summary judgment 
in favor of plaintiffs with respect to their conversion claim. 
DATED this J> ' dSy of November, 1999. 
:tT(. Mitchell 
Forney for Plaintiffs 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
Undersigrie^ certifies that two copies of the foregoing were 
mailed thisdf^"^ day of November, 1999, via first class U.S. 
Mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Randall L. Skeen 
5788 South 900 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
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IN THE THIRD -DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR THE 
STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE COUNTY 
-oOo-
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE ) 
OF: THURBER, RHODA ) SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
NELSON MITCHELL ) 
) Case No. 973900675 
Judge William A. Thome 
-oOo-
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 28th day of August, 
1998, the above-entitled matter came on for hearing before 
the Honorable William A. Thome, sitting as Judge in the 
above-named Court for the purpose of this cause, and that 
the following proceedings were had. 
-oOo-
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PRO-CE-E D I N G S 
THE COURT: And the other matter is 973900675, the 
matter of the estate of Rhoda Thurber. 
MR. MITCHELL: Good morning, Your Honor,., Scott 
Mitchell on behalf of the parties. 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Randall Skeen and Tom 
Mecham on behalf of defendant, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Are you ready to go forward with the 
partial summary judgment on this? 
MR. MITCHELL: Yes, Your Honor. 
MR. SKEEN: Yes, Your Honor, but I believe, I'm 
not sure they're partial, I think they're cross motions for 
complete summary judgment. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. MITCHELL: Actually mine's a partial motion 
for'summary judgment, though-at this time I can't remember 
why. 
THE COURT: Okay, go ahead, Mr. Mitchell. 
MR. MITCHELL: Your Honor, this involves a trust, 
a declaration of trust that was signed and recorded in April 
of 1980. The trustors were Joseph Thurber and Rhoda 
Thurber. They were the stepparents and parents of the 
plaintiffs and defendants. The plaintiff, Linda Jenkins, 
and defendants were the children of Rhoda Thurber, and Mrs. 
O C\ II D i i im n o t»rVi /-\ • e» V^  ^  >~*a *i r-i f- Vi ^ /~>s\i i «*»•- f- ^\*A m r ».»-» «-» •- V* ^ .J _ . . _ 1 _ *. ^ *-. -^ J 
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Joseph Thurber 
The trust transferred a lot of property, the main 
property being the residence, the party's residence into the 
trust. The problem arose when Joseph died, Rhoda^ took the 
property, sold it and transferred everything to the 
defendants in her will, she's now deceased. It's my 
understanding also that defendant Lloyd Mitchell died over 
the weekend or late last week sometime. 
In any event, the facts of this case, except for 
in two respects, are identical to the Supreme Court's 
decision in the Estate of West. The two important 
distinctions are in the West case the children didn't become 
beneficiaries specifically and by the terms of the trust 
until the trustors died. In this case, the language is 
different. And I don't know if the Court's had the benefit 
of "'reading "the briefs but x^Trs~ spelled out pretty distinctly 
by both parties in the briefs. 
The other fact is that, and actually there's two 
facts, the Declaration of Trust in this case provides that, 
and it's aimed at making a protective barrier to protect 
each parties children, in other words, to protect the 
stepchildren when the, when that childrens' parent died. 
And the trust provides if one of the above listed trustors 
should be deceased the beneficiaries cannot be changed. In 
other words, what if Joseph dies, Rhoda can't cut Jeanine 
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out, okay, that's specif i.naT-ly i-n~the~t£ust, and that's a 
distinction with the West case. 
I just want to read a passage from the West case 
that deals with this. "The trust incident is cl^ar that the 
children do not become beneficiaries," and this is the 
Courtfs quotes, "the death of the survivor of the two 
settlers." Then it goes to reason of trust. 
THE COURT: Is that pursuant to the language of 
the trust or is that just by operation of law? 
MR. MITCHELL: That is pursuant to -the language of 
11 I  the trust. The Court goes on to quote the language of the 
12 trust and the emphasized language in the trust that the 
13 Court, in the whole passage, is death of the survivor of us. 
14 Okay, that's not in our trust. Then the Court goes on to 
15 say the children's vested rights are subject to divestiture 
16 and will"not ride until the death of the surviving settler. 
17 In our case it transfers it in trust and 
18 specifically identifies these beneficiaries and says nothing 
19 about surviving until it goes down, and this is something 
20 defendant's brought up in their brief, when it talks about 
21 after they die then it talks about distributing to the 
22 surviving beneficiaries, okay, but nothing in the granting 
23 language, and that's the language and the important part of 
24 the West case. But I think even more important, as a matter 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
6 
is the intention of t-K<=> p5>£-i gg .". 
Now, in the West case the trust, there was no 
limitation on the trustors, or the trustees right to revoke 
or alter the trust ever. In our case it's specifically, and 
this is a formed trust, that the language that I'm pointing 
out to the Court about the beneficiaries cannot be changed 
when one of the parties dies, that's typed in, okay, that's 
8 I  the parties themselves that put that in there, that's not 
9 just boiler plate. 
10 And I'll read another part from the West case. 
11 The West case had three part test, only two of which are at 
12 issue before the Court today. One of those is, okay, the 
13 two trustors had the power to sell the property and revoke 
14 the trust before one of them died, okay. The Court found 
15 that to be present in West and that's present indisputably 
16 in this "case. The second tes~t~~is after one of the trustors 
17 die whether the other trustor inherited all powers, in other 
18 words, whether she could revoke that. And here in the West 
19 case the Court said a sole trustee would, held that they did 
20 in that case because otherwise a sole trustee would have 
21 less power than the joint trustees held, and the Court said, 
22 "That would be illogical as nothing in the trust instrument 
23 denies a sole trustee any of the powers possessed by the 
24 I joint trustee." 
Tn mir r^ ase it clearly does. It says after one of 
7 
1 || us dies you can't rhangp FHP_ bpnpf i r.i *-H PS ; you can't cut 
2 I Jeanine out of her inheritance. 
3 II THE COURT: Well, what about withdrawing property 
4 || from the trust though, is that restricted?
 ?rir 
5 MR. MITCHELL: It is. What is says in here is if 
6 the home is sold, and that's what happened, the money is to 
7 be put in a trust designated the Thurber Trust, okay, that 
8 wasn't done. Basically what they did is they started 
9 distributing it to Rhoda while she was alive and then to the 
10 defendants after she died. So, I'll reserve -the rest of my 
11 time for rebuttal. 
12 THE COURT: Mr. Skeen? 
13 MR. SKEEN: Thank you, Your Honor. May I 
14 approach? I've got a copy of the case that is in the trust 
15 so that the Court can follow along. Your Honor, this is a 
16 fairly complex case factually, but I think it's pretty 
17 simple legally. One thing I think Counsel and I both agree 
18 on is that the matter can be disposed of via Summary 
19 Judgment, and secondly, that the West case is controlling, 
20 and I don't know whether we just read it differently or not. 
21 But just to start out, if I could go over just the 
22 facts so that we're all on the same page there, on April 1st 
23 of 1980, Joseph and Rhoda Thurber executed the Declaration 
24 of Trust, a copy of which I've provided to Counsel and the 
25 Court. In 1995, Joseph died and later that year, or excuse 
8 
1 ||me, 1985, Joseph died." La t- f*r '~t ha t -year -on December 16th, 
2 || Rhoda executed a will which revoked all prior testamentary 
3 I  instruments. On June 29th of 1992, she executed a second 
4 will, which again, revoked all prior testamentary^documents 
5 and neither one of the two wills mentioned, the '85 or the 
6 '92 mentioned the plaintiffs as beneficiaries. 
7 They, incidentally, were stepchildren of Rhoda's 
8 and maybe Counsel didn't make that clear. 
9 THE COURT: And children of Joseph's? 
10 MR. SKEEN: And children of Joseph'-S, correct. 
11 THE COURT: Okay. 
12 MR. SKEEN: On August 15, of 1992, Rhoda sold the 
13 home, which I think forms really the basis of the dispute. 
14 THE COURT: The home is conveyed in this 
15 Declaration of Trust to the trust? 
16 MR. SKEEN: Yes. Anyway, in 19 92 the home is sold 
17 to (inaudible), one of which is a granddaughter of Rhoda, 
18 pursuant to a contract which paid $612 per month. 
19 THE COURT: Did the title documents identify the 
2 0 trust as the holder of the home? 
21 MR. SKEEN: I believe so. I don't have copies of 
22 those with me, Your Honor, but I believe they did. Well, 
23 which trust? She formed a secondary trust in--
24 THE COURT: Okay, of the one that you just handed 
O C II mf» f h i s — 
1 || MR. SKEEN: The TO Id >one, the _ 1980 one? 
2 || THE COURT: Right, was that the '80 trust? 
3 II MR. SKEEN: Yes. 
4 II THE COURT: I guess it is. 
5 J) MR. SKEEN: Uh-huh. 
6 THE COURT: And so the title documents would have 
7 identified this trust, the !80 trust as the holder of the 
8 home? 
9 MR. SKEEN: I believe that they did. 
10 THE COURT: And so the proceeds from that sale 
11 they should have funneled into the trust, did they not do 
12 that? 
13 MR. SKEEN: Well, they did not because, again, 
14 consistent with our argument and with the West case, they 
15 didn't need to. The trust was revoked. And then the 
16 Einal-
17 THE COURT: Are there documents that revoke this 
18 trust as opposed to simply, it says, revokes testamentary 
19 instruments. 
20 MR. SKEEN: Right, those are the only ones, but 
21 it's going to be done pursuant to the terms of the 1980 
22 trust, I'm getting right to that. 
23 THE COURT: Okay. 
24 MR. SKEEN: The last fact, Your Honor, is that on 
25 I  December 22nd--oh, I wanted to indicate when she diri SP! 1 
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the home she lived on the .prngpp.ds of -t-.hp $612 per month 
until she died on December 22, of 1996. Now, the West case 
identifies three issues, and Counsel alluded to them as 
well. And they're the identical issues in this-^ase, the 
ones that were identified by the Court are the exact same 
ones. 
The first issue is did Rhoda have the authority 
pursuant to the trust to terminate the trust pursuant to the 
terms thereof? I'm not sure whether plaintiffs' agree, I 
think I heard them say they do, but just so we're all on the 
same page, drawing your attention to paragraph three of the 
1980 Declaration of Trust. It says, "We reserve unto 
ourselves the power and right at any time during our 
lifetime to amend or revoke in whole or in part the trust 
hereby created without necessity of obtaining consent of any 
of 'the beneficiaries and without giving notice to any 
beneficiary, but no such amendment or revocation shall be 
effective unless and until it is filed in the land records." 
That's part one, that was identified, and 
incidentally the language is virtually identical in the West 
case trust. That language states pursuant to the Supreme 
Court that that gives the settlers, which would be Rhoda and 
the decedent at that time, the opportunity and ability 
without notifying the beneficiaries, without doing anything 
to terminate the trust. 
11 
1 II The second sentencer however—applies to the 
2 trustees. It says, "The sell or disposition by us of the 
3 whole or any part of the property held here under shall 
4 constitute as to such whole or part revocation o£rthis 
5 trust." So I think reading the West case, and clearly the 
6 language of the 1980 trust, it does allow the trust to be 
7 terminated. 
8 And the second issue is, well, and I might 
9 indicate also that once the property, the real property was 
10 conveyed to Pizzance the trust was absolutely terminated. 
11 Whether it had been so in the 1992 will, the 1995 
12 disposition document. 
13 THE COURT: Did the West case talk in terms of the 
14 "us" that's there? Does that require--
15 MR. SKEEN: It did. It did. 
16 THE COURT: --that the trustors to be both alive? 
17 MR. SKEEN: It did, yes, and it said they do not. 
18 That's one of the prime holdings. That's why the West case 
19 is precisely on point. Now, the second issue is just what 
20 you've stated. The second issue is can a surviving co-
21 trustee or co-settler unilaterally exercise the right to 
22 terminate a trust subsequent to the death of the co-trustee? 
23 The West case said absolutely. The trust says absolutely. 
24 I draw your attention first to paragraph five of 
1 
2 
3 
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us, the survivor shalT rnnfvnwp -as sole—trustee. M In the 
West case it said exactly the same thing. They held that 
once Mr. West's prior spouse had died he was the sole 
4 I  trustee and had all the authority under the willr-and under 
5 statutory law to act as such. Now, in fact, we have a code 
6 section that paraphrases that, it's Utah Code Annotated 
7 75.7.405 (2), and it clearly says that once you have the 
8 demise of one trustee or settler then the survivor has all 
9 the authority of both of them, and that includes the 
10 authority to revoke.m 
11 Now, the third issue, and I think again, if I'm 
12 reading it right, I think plaintiffs' agree with that. I 
13 think what they're disputing is really the third issue, and 
14 that is whether or not Rhoda had the authority or was it a 
15 breach of her fiduciary duty to terminate the trust? And in 
16 the Continental Bank case which we cited in our brief and 
17 also was cited by the West Court it says, and I quote, "The 
18 trustee can exercise exclusive control over trust property 
19 subject to the limitations imposed by law or by the trust 
2 0 instrument." 
21 Now, if we give that third issue, was she able to 
22 basically terminate the trust, we know that she has the 
23 authority to do it, but could she terminate the trust and do 
24 I what she did without violating her fiduciary duty? The 
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precludes that. Well, and they -s-ay that, in their brief 
they said, "Well, it doesn't say upon the death of the 
survivor of us," type language. And, you know, they say 
that that differentiates us from the West case.xr: 
Well, if I draw the Court's attention, it's the 
very next paragraph under where the beneficiaries are named. 
It says, "Upon the death of the survivor of us, unless all 
the beneficiaries shall predecease us or unless we shall die 
as a result of a common accident or disaster, our successor 
trustee," this is after they die, "is hereby -directed to 
forthwith transfer said property and all right title and 
interest to said property unto the beneficiaries absolutely 
and thereby terminate this trust." 
That is precisely the language in the West case, 
15 it's just in a different part of the West trust. They're 
16 both these little form book trusts, is what the West Court 
17 calls them. And it just happened to be one paragraph 
18 farther below is all. But it says exactly the same thing. 
19 What does it say? The survivor of us, provided all the 
20 beneficiaries are still alive, says, "Our successor 
21 trustee," and this is after both of us die, "is directed to 
22 transfer the property." 
23 Now, that tracks exactly with the third issue as 
24 identified in the West Court. What happened there is West, 
25 Hershel West was the beneficiary of the trust and he was 
14 
1 also the trustee. This_'c^ sft ts -a-little bit different 
2 because the beneficiaries of the trust were Rhoda and the 
3 other named plaintiff and her brother, Lloyd, who died last 
4 week. But the Supreme Court clearly states thatr£hese 
5 beneficiaries have different status, and that's the 
6 important, and the ruling in the West case. The 
7 plaintiff's, Your Honor, were contingent beneficiaries 
8 subject to change. Whereas Rhoda, just like Hershel West, 
9 was an active beneficiary. 
10 And the case says exactly that. In fact, in 
11 probably the best language in the case for us, and I'll draw 
12 your attention to page 354 of the West case, which I've 
13 provided, and I've hi-lighted it in yellow. It defies 
14 common sense--
15 THE COURT: Just a moment. 
16 MR. SKEEN: 3 54, it's on the right hand column, 
17 about 60 percent down. 
18 THE COURT: Okay. 
19 MR. SKEEN: "It defies common sense that a couple 
20 creating a revocable inner viva voce trust naming themselves 
21 as trustees would deliberately preclude themselves from 
22 fully utilizing the property for their own benefit while 
23 both or either one of them was alive, particularly when it 
24 appears that the purpose of the form book trust document may 
25 have been simply to avoid probate. Therefore, we conclude 
15 
1 || that upon the death of Haa@l Wesfc-r-Hershel West succeeded to 
2 || all the powers exercisable by the joint trustees, including 
3 || the power to sell or dispose of the property which works as 
4 I  a revocation of the trust." 
5 That, Your Honor, is exactly what we have here. 
6 You have two distinct groups of beneficiaries. You have an 
7 active beneficiary that has all the rights to do basically 
8 whatever they want with that property during their lifetime, 
9 that's why it's an inner viva voce trust. And then you have 
10 a secondary contingent group that, whofs rights arise upon 
11 death of the surviving trustee provided there has been no 
12 other distribution, sell, termination or revocation of the 
13 trust. And that is simply in a nutshell what the case says 
14 and what this case is all about. 
15 The, we wouldn't be here today, Your Honor, if 
16 Rhoda~Raclnvt/ pursuant to the terms of the trust, sold the 
17 home or if Rhoda hadn't, pursuant to the terms of the trust, 
18 terminated the trust by doing new wills, preparing new 
19 wills. Now, it's interesting, and I'm not sure it's even an 
20 issue because I think that the three part test as defined by 
21 the West Court case, those three prongs have been met 
22 clearly. I mean, this case is right on point. And then, of 
23 course, we get to this other language about the home was 
24 sold, it's put into a trust, blah, blah, blah, please note 
25 I  that we don!t know, and there's no authentication of when 
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that language was put in-. The signa-fcttre-s are above that and 
there's no initialing. 
And on the first page where there were some strike 
outs you'll notice that the parties to the trust-'initialed 
that so it is not a self authenticating instrument in any 
event. But I don't think we even need to get that far. I 
think the trust was terminated according to the terms of the 
trust and according to the law as defined in the West case. 
Thank you. 
MR. MITCHELL: Your Honor, the trust instrument 
was recorded on April 1, 1980. The suggestion that somehow 
this was put in later is ridiculous. The December 1985 will 
is not in evidence, it's not an issue in this case, it's 
never been brought up, hasn't been briefed, we've never seen 
it. I assume that the June 29, 1992, will is on file 
somewhere, but it's certainly never been briefed, it's not 
an exhibit, it's nothing. The effect of those wills on this 
case is not at issue. 
Counsel says that we're not disputing two and 
three of the West case and that's not correct. The West 
case, and Counsel reads the part of the West case that says, 
"Defies common sense that a couple creating a revocable 
inner viva voce trust naming themselves as trustee would 
deliberately preclude themselves from fully utilizing the 
property for their own benefit." That's clearly not the 
1 
2 
17 
case in ours. You look afibve>'that-a—couple of sentences, 
"Nothing in the trust instrument denies--
3 II THE COURT: Okay, where are you? 
4 MR. MITCHELL: Two sentences above ther-language 
5 on, and I've got the advanced reports, so--
6 THE COURT: Two sentences above, it's "For 
7 example?" 
8 MR. MITCHELL: Okay, three sentences above. I 
9 apologize. 
10 THE COURT: Okay, "That would be iLlogical?" 
11 MR. MITCHELL: "As nothing in the instrument 
12 itself denies a sole trustee any of the powers possessed by 
13 the joint trustee.". In our case the trust instrument 
14 specifically denies the sole trustee the power to change the 
15 beneficiaries, okay. What they intended on doing is 
16 preventing "Joseph from cutting out the defendants and 
17 plaintiff, Linda Jenkins, after Rhoda died and preventing 
II '* • — 
18 Rhoda from doing exactly what she did in this case and that 
19 is cutting Jeanine out after Joseph died. That's exactly 
20 what they intended to do, and that's the first rule of 
21 construction in interpreting a trust is the intent of the 
22 parties, okay. 
23 That is a factual distinction with the West case 
24 that decides this case right there, okay. As far as the 
2 5 contingent beneficiary argument, the West Court, when it 
1 I  emphasizes the death of tfie :sUrvivor-o£-us and says, the 
2 children's vested rights, and talks about contingent 
3 beneficiaries, points to the Grossbeck case. And the 
4 Grossbeck case, which is 935P(2)12.55 talks about--a 
5 contingent remainder, IE, the beneficiaries interest is 
6 contingent upon surviving the grand tort, okay. And that's 
7 exactly the case in West. 
8 This is an easy case. The West case is 
9 controlling, but the West case says, one, if the trust 
10 instrument says something that controls it. If it doesn't, 
11 then they can revoke it with the power of revocation. But 
12 here the trust instrument specifically says after one of us 
13 dies you can't do that, okay. We're going to submit it on 
14 that basis, Your Honor. 
15 MR. SKEEN: Your Honor, may I have one last word, 
16 there were "cross motions'? 
17 THE COURT: Go ahead. 
18 MR. SKEEN: Even if the Court, the Court, it's a 
19 smokescreen. We don't need to get to the issue of whether 
20 or not they could change beneficiaries, you don't even need 
21 to get that far. The document itself, she didn't change the 
22 beneficiaries, she terminated the trust, and there's a 
23 distinction there. And by right and by law in the West case 
24 fthe three prongs were met, we showed them right in the trust 
25 I itself. And, therefore, she didn't change the 
19 
1 II beneficiaries, she didn't^add; a-he-dirdn-^t take them away, 
2 she terminated it pursuant to her legal authority to do so. 
3 Thanks. 
4 MR. MITCHELL: Your Honor, the intent^of the 
5 parties was to prevent, and it's obvious, it's very clear, 
6 it's undisputed that that was the intent of Joseph and Rhoda 
7 was to prevent Rhoda from doing exactly what she did. The 
8 argument that she didn't change beneficiaries, that's not 
9 it, that's not it. Maybe she didn't change beneficiaries, 
10 she revoked the trust contrary to the intent.- But suppose 
11 she could revoke the trust, and she couldn't, okay, she 
12 couldn't do that because that's how the parties intended it 
13 and it's very clear. Suppose she could revoke the trust. 
14 Could she do it in violation of-her fiduciary duty 
15 (inaudible)? No, she couldn't, and that's the distinction 
16 in West. It doesn't require, this trust does not require 
17 that Jeanine or that Jeanine survive Rhoda in order to be a 
18 beneficiary, okay. 
19 They point out that this trust has the same 
2 0 language as the West trust. Well, Your Honor, it has the 
21 same language but it's in a different paragraph, it has a 
22 different meaning, and it has a different scenario. What 
2 3 this language upon the death of the survivor says is that on 
24 the death of the survivors you give the property away and 
20 
l|| don't become beneficiaries' until fe-he—death of a survivor. 
2 || So when Counsel stands up here and says that it does, take a 
3 || look at that, Your Honor. It's a silly argument and I don't 
4 || know how you can stand up here and make it. 
5 II THE COURT: One at a time. 
6 I MR. MITCHELL: What this case is about, this is 
7 || not a case about greedy people, okay. The defendants aren't 
8 greedy. Let me tell you what this case is about. There's, 
9 the State of Utah has a $35,000 medical lien on the will, 
10 okay. If defendants win this case the State -of Utah's paid 
11 $35,000, okay. If plaintiffs win this case, plaintiffs are 
12 paid $20,000 or something. So what the defendants are 
13 doing, and it's the defendant Lila Harman, she is doing this 
14 out of spite, okay. She knows that it's more money that's 
15 going to go in her pocket if we win, but she wants to cut 
16 Mrs. Purhue out. 
17 This is simply a matter of spite. It is not 
18 legally justifiable, it's not factually justifiable and it's 
19 not morally justifiable. 
2 0 THE COURT: I'm going to grant Summary Judgment 
21 finding that the trust was terminated by the sell of the 
22 property. The language, I'm assuming for the sake of 
23 argument that Mr. Mitchell is correct that the parties 
24 wanted to set up a trust that would not be changed after one 
25 I  died. I mean, I read that as the intent to the language 
21 
1 || where it says, "If one of -the rabeve Gristed should be 
2 || deceased, the beneficiaries cannot be changed." But I'm 
3 || going to find as a matter of law that that is insufficient 
4 || to prevent the revocation of the trust after oner of them 
5 II dies 
6 II That the language is a revocable trust and as such 
7 one of the trustees can revoke it. They could not change 
8 the beneficiaries. The parties are not here, we're stuck 
9 with the language that they agreed upon. The language that 
10 they agreed upon was that the beneficiaries could not be 
11 changed as opposed to the trust could not be revoked. I 
12 happen to think it's an unfortunate result but I think 
13 that's what the language compels. 
14 Counsel, not for the purpose of argument, but just 
15 to preserve Appellate Review, is there anything that you 
16 want me to address specifically? 
17 MR. MITCHELL: Perhaps the third prong of it, the 
18 test. 
19 THE COURT: Which was which one? 
2 0 MR. MITCHELL: Whether it breached fiduciary duty. 
21 THE COURT: Okay, I'm going to find that there is 
22 not a fiduciary duty to the beneficiaries until they have 
23 arrived, which is basically after the surviving trustee 
24 dies. 
25 I! MR. MITCHET/T,- Thank von. Ynnr Hnnnr 
MR. SKEEN: Thank -you,' Your-Honor. 
THE COURT: Anything that you want to address, Mr. 
Skeen, for the record? 
MR. SKEEN: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay, will you draw the findings in 
the Order then? 
MR. SKEEN: I will. Thank you. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
(Proceedings concluded) 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT 0? THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JEANNINE PERRENOUD; and 
LINDA JENKINS 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
LILA ANN HARMAN, individually ; 
and in her capacity as Personal ; 
Representative of the Estate of ; 
Rhoda Nelson Mitchell Thurber; ] 
LLOYD MITCHELL; ] 
JOHN DOES I THROUGH V; and ] 
JANE DOES I THROUGH V ] 
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1 FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
1 SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
i Civil No. 9739/0675 
w 
Judge William A. Thome 
Plaintiffs' and Defendants' Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment 
came on regularly for hearing on the 28th day of August, 1998, 
before the Honorable William A. Thome, District Court Judge. 
Plaintiff Perrenoud was present and represented by her counsel, 
Scott B. Mitchell and Defendants were not present but represented 
by their counsel, Randall L. Skeen and Todd R. Mecham. Based upon 
the pleadings and papers contained within the Court's file, the 
evidence presented at the hearing, argument of counsel and good 
cause appearing, the Court hereby finds and orders as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On April 1, 1980, Joseph Thurber and Rhoda Thurber 
executed an inter-vivos trust known as the Thurber Trust. Pursuant 
to the terms of the Thurber Trust, Joseph and Rhoda Thurber were 
appointed as Trustees. Thereafter certain property;as identified 
within the Trust was transferred to the Trust. 
2. Paragraph 3 of the Thurber Trust authorized the Thurbers 
to revoke the Trust by selling or otherwise disposing of any part 
of the property held within the Trust, without obtaining the 
consent of any named beneficiary. 
3. Paragraph 5 of the Thurber Trust authorized a surviving 
co-trustee to act as sole trustee of the Trust. 
4. In 1985, Joseph Thurber died. 
5. On June 29, 1992, Rhoda Thurber executed a Will and Trust 
which revoked all prior testamentary instruments. Said Will and 
Trust did not identify Plaintiffs as beneficiaries and appointed 
Defendants as trustees and beneficiaries. 
6. On or about August 15, 1992, Rhoda Thurber sold the 
property and home identified in the Trust documents to Robert 
Bezzant and Holli Bezzant. 
7. On December 22, 1996, Rhoda Thurber died. 
2 
8. Pursuant to order of this Court, Defendant Lila M. Herman 
was appointed Personal Representative of the Estate of Rhoda Nelson 
Mitchell Thurber. 
9. Rhoda Thurber as surviving co-Settlor and sole trustee had 
authority to terminate the Thurber Trust prior to her death. 
10. Rhoda Thurber was an active beneficiary of the Trust and 
Plaintiffs were contingent beneficiaries of the Trust. 
11. As the sole surviving acting beneficiary, Rhoda Thurber 
could act to terminate the Thurber Trust without breaching a 
fiduciary duty to any contingent beneficiary. 
12. Rhoda Thurber did not change the beneficiaries of the 
Thurber Trust. 
13. The Thurber Trust was terminated by Rhoda Thurber upon 
her sale of the property on or about August 15, 1992. 
14. There are no witnesses to provide testimony and, 
therefore, the Court must construe the clear language of the Trust 
documents. 
15. The Trust provisions relating to changing beneficiaries 
and disposition of proceeds from sale of the home are insufficient 
to prevent Rhoda Thurber from revoking the Trust. 
16. Defendants did not convert any property belonging to 
Plaintiffs. 
3 
17. Rhoda Thurber did not owe Plaintiffs a fiduciary duty 
with respect to administration of the Thurber Trust as the same had 
been revoked. 
18. Defendant Lila M. Karman did not owe Plaintiffs a 
fiduciary duty with respect to the Thurber Trust as the same had 
been revoked. 
ORDER OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and good cause 
appearing, the Court hereby orders as follows: 
1. Summary judgment is hereby entered in favor of Defendants 
pursuant to their Counterclaim and against Plaintiffs; and 
2. Plaintiffs' Complaint iPK^ t^flJX dismissed with prejudice. 
DATED this 1^ day of September, 1998. 
BY THE CQUR 
f&^>^ i4jq 
WILLIAM;A. .THORtfE 
Di s t r f<$t - JSourtri^; 
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The foregoing Findings of Fact and Order was mailed to Scott 
B. Mitchell at 175 South Main Street, Salt Lake City, UT 84111 on 
this . S day of September 1998. 
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